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Abstract In this paper we identify two types of the evidential perspective shifts (the
evidence holder indicated by an evidential marker is different from the utterance of
the sentence containing that evidential marker) in Korean, the shift in interrogatives
and the shift in declaratives, and explain these two shifts by proposing specific
lexical entries for Korean evidential markers without any significant revision of the
existing theory of interrogatives or indexicals. We also discuss an implication of
our proposal, especially with respect to the interaction between our lexical entry
for the Korean direct evidential marker and the Korean long-distance anaphor caki.
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1 Introduction
This paper aims to discuss two types of evidential perspective shifts in Korean (Lim
2010, Lee C. 2011, among others), and to investigate its theoretical implications.
By the term evidential perspective shift, we mean (1):
(1) EVIDENTIAL PERSPECTIVE SHIFT
The evidence holder indicated by an evidential marker is different from the
utterer of the sentence containing that evidential marker.
To see what definition (1) means, consider the following two Korean examples in
(2), where the direct perceptual evidential -te- is employed.
(2) a. John-i
John-NOM
ne-lul
you-ACC
chac-te-ra.
look.for-DIR.EVI-DECL
‘John looked for you.’
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Perspective Shifts of Korean Evidentials
Implication: the speaker has direct evidence regarding the prejacent that
John looked for the addressee.
b. John-i
John-NOM
ne-lul
you-ACC
chac-te-nya?
look.for-DIR.EVI-Q
‘Did John look for you?’
Implication: the addresseei is expected to answer whether John looked for
heri based on heri direct perceptual evidence.
In (2a) the utterer of the sentence is also the one who has the direct evidence re-
garding the prejacent: the utterer has directly perceived (via visual or auditory per-
ception, for example) that John looked for the addressee. However, in (2b), as we
can see in the implication the sentence carries, the utterer of (2b) does not have any
direct evidence, but it is the addressee who is expected by the speaker to have direct
perceptual evidence and to answer based on that evidence. Here we can see that the
evidential perspective is shifted from the utterer’s to the addressee’s.
Previous studies on the evidential perspective shift (for example, see McCready
2007; also see origo shift in Garrett 2001 and interrogative flip in Tenny 2006,
among others) mainly discuss the shift in questions, such as (2b). However, as
far as we can see, they are not satisfactory to account for the shift in Korean in
two respects. First, they predict that the evidential perspective shift in questions is
optional, but in Korean this shift is obligatory (see Lim 2010: ch.4). Second, they
do not consider the fact that Korean also shows the evidential perspective shift in
declaratives (observed in Lee C. 2011, inter alia), the example of which is in (3):
(3) John-i
John-NOM
Bill-ul
Bill-ACC
chac-te-ray.
look.for-DIR.EVI-REP.EVI
‘John looked for Bill.’
Implication: the source of the speaker’s reportative evidence has direct per-
ceptual evidence regarding the prejacent that John looked for Bill.
In (3), we can see that two evidentials — the direct perceptual evidential -te- and
the indirect reportative evidential -ray1 — are used in a single sentence. Looking
at the implication of (3) carefully, we can see that there is no shift with respect
to the reportative evidential -ray, whereas we do have the shift with respect to the
direct evidential -te- (the utterer of (3) does not have direct evidence but only has
reportative evidence regarding the prejacent).
This paper aims to analyze these two types of the evidential perspective shifts
in Korean, without significantly revising the existent theories of indexicals (such as
1 We simply treat -tay as an allomorph of -ray, and for simplicity we will continue to use -ray. See
also Lim 2010 which argues that a pre-final -ta- is an indirect/reportative evidential marker.
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Kaplan 1989) or questions (such as Hamblin 1973 and Karttunen 1977). Specifi-
cally, we will show that two types of shifts can be easily accounted for by simply
assuming that Korean evidentials are operators binding and overwriting the context
parameter of the prejacent (cf. Anand & Nevins 2004). After explaining two types
of shifts, we will also discuss the theoretical implication of our proposal, especially
with respect to an interaction between evidentials and the Korean long-distance
anaphor caki.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we analyze the evidential per-
spective shift in questions. Here we briefly illustrate Lim’s (2010) proposal we
essentially adopt, and explain how his proposal accounts for the perspective shift in
questions with Korean direct evidential -te-. Next, in Section 3, we extend Lim’s
(2010) proposal to the case of the shift in declaratives, and explain it by assuming
the same type for the lexical entry of -ray as the lexical entry of -te-. In Section 4
we discuss how our proposal of Korean evidentials as context-overwriting operator
accounts for the exceptional licensing of the logophor caki in Korean, the problem
first pointed out by Lim (to appear). In Section 5 we conclude the paper and discuss
remaining problems.
2 The perspective shift in questions
In this section we discuss the evidential perspective shift in questions. Before pre-
senting our analysis, however, we introduce the theoretical assumptions we adopt.
2.1 Theoretical assumptions
First, we adopt Kaplan’s (1989) theory of indexicals, where a context is a tuple of
the world, the time, the utterer, and the addressee of a sentence:
(4) c = < w, t,u,a>
A sentence is a function from contexts to intensions (which he calls a character),
and an intension is a function from worlds to truth-values. Indexicals are assumed
to directly receive their denotation from the context. Therefore, if we call c∗ the
context of the utterance, and UTTERER and ADDRESSEE functions taking a context
and returning the utterer and the addressee in that context, respectively, then the
denotation of the 1st person pronoun na and the 2nd person pronoun ne in c∗ is the
utterer and the addressee of c∗, that is u∗ and a∗, respectively, as shown in (5):
(5) a. c∗ = < w∗, t∗,u∗,a∗ >
b. JnaKc
∗,w∗ = UTTERER(c∗) = u∗
c. JneKc
∗,w∗ = ADDRESSEE(c∗) = a∗
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Second, we assume the (rather standard) semantics of questions, first proposed
by Hamblin (1973) and then Karttunen (1977), according to which the denotation of
a question is the set of its possible answers. Specifically we adopt Hamblin (1973),
and assume that we derive a set of answers from a proposition on behalf of the
semantics of wh-words. For example, who denotes a set of persons (see 6a), and
whether, which appears in yes-no questions (either overtly or covertly), denotes a
set of two functions, one taking a proposition and returning the same proposition,
and the other taking a proposition and returning its negation (which we simplify as
identity function and negation function, as in 6b):
(6) a. JwhoK = {xe: x is a person}
b. JwhetherK = {λ pst .pst , λ pst .∼pst} (or {ID<st,st>, NEG<st,st>})
Since here wh-words denote a set of individuals, properties, or functions taking
propositions, we find cases where either functions are in a set, arguments are in a
set, or both arguments and functions are in different sets, as shown in (7). In these
cases the regular functional application does not apply. To avoid this problem, we
introduce a new compositional rule, that is Pointwise Functional Application (PFA)
(first assumed by Hamblin (1973) and rendered by Heim & von Fintel (2001) as 8):
(7) a. [ [ α<σ ,τ> ] [ {β : β∈Dσ} ] ]
b. [ [ {α: α<σ ,τ>} ] [ β∈Dσ ] ]
c. [ [ {α: α<σ ,τ>} ] [ {β : β∈Dσ} ] ]
(8) POINTWISE FUNCTIONAL APPLICATION (PFA) (from Heim & von Fintel
2001)
If α is a branching node and {β , γ} is the set of its daughters, then JαK¢=
a. λw.Jβ K¢(w)(JγK¢(w)) or
b. {λw.Jβ K¢(w)(x(w)): x∈JγK¢} or
c. {λw. f (w)(JγK¢(w)): f∈Jβ K¢} or
d. {λw. f (w)(x(w)): f∈Jβ K¢ & x∈JγK¢}
whichever is defined.
With the PFA defined in (8), we can derive a set of type τ from each tree in (7).
2.2 Explaining the shift in questions
Now we are ready to introduce our analysis of the evidential perspective shift in
questions. We essentially adopt Lim’s (2010, in preparation) analysis, according to
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which a question including an evidential marker denotes a set of characters, rather
than a set of propositions. According to Lim (2010), this can be done by assuming
that Korean evidentials are functions from propositions to characters, introducing a
variable over contexts. Following this analysis, we propose that Korean evidentials
overwrite the context parameter against which the prejacent is evaluated (see also
Anand & Nevins 2004 and McCready 2007). Under our analysis, for example, the
lexical entry for the direct perceptual evidential -te- is (9):
(9) For any utterance context c∗, any world of evaluation w∗, and the prejacent
φ of type < s, t >:
J-te-Kc
∗,w∗(JφKc
∗,w∗) = λc: UTTERER(c) has direct perceptual evidence re-
garding φ . λw. JφKc,w
According to (9), -te- takes a proposition as its argument, returns a character and
overwrites the utterance context c∗ with the new context c which by itself is bound.
We also assume that -te- also introduces the definedness condition (that is presuppo-
sition), according to which the utterer in c has direct perceptual evidence regarding
the prejacent.2
Let us see how the lexical entry in (9) explains the evidential perspective shift
in interrogatives with the example in (10):
(10) John-i
John-NOM
na-lul
I-ACC
chac-te-nya?
look.for-DIR.EVI-Q
‘Did John look for me?’
Implication: the utterer expects the addressee to answer whether John looked
for the utterer based on the addressee’s direct perceptual evidence.
We assume that the LF of (10) is (11), where the first person pronoun na denotes
the utterer in c∗ and -te- takes wide scope over covert whether:3
2 As Murray (2009) rightly points out, a problem of this analysis is that evidentials seem to intro-
duce new information regarding the speaker’s evidence to the common ground (CG). Although we
acknowledge this problem, for simplicity in computation, we will keep assuming that -te- is a pre-
supposition trigger (see also Schlenker 2007, arguing that some presuppositions may introduce new
information to the CG). We do not deal with the question of whether -te- is an epistemic modal or not
either, but unlike what Lee J. (2010) argues, we believe that there is not enough evidence supporting
the claim that -te- is an epistemic modal (see Lim 2010 and Lee C. 2011 for further arguments).
3 At first sight this LF seems counterintuitive, but as argued by Lim (2010), this choice is purely due
to semantic computation. Suppose that -te- takes narrow scope with respect to whether. Then the
sister node of whether would denote a character, whereas each function in the denotation of whether
needs to combine with a proposition, resulting in type-mismatch.
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(11) (ii)
(i)
λw. JJohn looked for UTTERER(c∗)Kc
∗,w
{ID<st,st>, NEG<st,st>}
-te-
The denotation at node (i) in (11) is (12), which is obtained by combining each
function in the denotation of whether with the proposition that John looked for the
utterer in c∗ via PFA (8b):
(12) J(i)Kc
∗,w∗ = {λw.JJohn looked for UTTERER(c∗)Kc
∗,w,
λw.JJohn did not look for UTTERER(c∗)Kc
∗,w}
Two functions in (12) correspond to the affirmative answer and the negative answer,
respectively. Now, these two functions combine with -te- via PFA (8c), as in (13):
(13) J(ii)Kc
∗,w∗ =
J-te-Kc
∗,w∗({λw.JJohn looked for UTTERER(c∗)Kc
∗,w,
λw. JJohn did not look for UTTERER(c∗)Kc
∗
,w})
= {J-te-Kc
∗,w∗(λw.JJohn looked for UTTERER(c∗)Kc
∗,w),
J-te-Kc
∗,w∗(λw.JJohn did not look for UTTERER(c∗)Kc
∗,w)}
Finally, applying the lexical entry for -te- in (9), we obtain (14), a set of two char-
acters where the context parameter c∗ in the prejacent is overwritten by the context
variable c introduced by -te-:
(14) J(ii)Kc
∗,w∗ =
{λc: UTTERER(c) has direct perceptual evidence re. the prejacent that John
looked for UTTERER(c∗): λw. JJohn looked for UTTERER(c∗)Kc,w,
λc: UTTERER(c) has direct perceptual evidence re. the prejacent that J. did
not look for UTTERER(c∗): λw. JJ. did not look for UTTERER(c∗)Kc,w}
To see how (14) explains the shift in questions, suppose an utterer asks the question
in (10). In Hamblin’s (1973) theory of questions, this means that the utterer presents
a set of (possible) answers (that is (14)) to the addressee. However, since the entire
set of answers is presented, none the answers in (14) are directly uttered by the
utterer: each answer can be uttered only when the addressee chooses it as his/her
true answer.
Now, consider each answer in (14). In each answer, the evidential presupposi-
tion is anchored to the variable c, which is still bound. Since none of the answers
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in (14) is directly uttered by the utterer, the variable c cannot be saturated by the
utterer’s context, which means that this presupposition cannot be anchored to the
utterer. The utterer can only expect that one of these presuppositions will be an-
chored to the addressee when he/she chooses one of the answers as his/her true an-
swer: when one of these answers (which are characters) is uttered by the addressee,
it applies to the addressee’s context, and then the presupposition is anchored to the
utterer in the addressee’s context, or the addressee.
Summarizing the discussion above: we have shown that our lexical entry for
Korean evidentials, a function from propositions to characters, accounts for the
evidential perspective shift in questions without any further stipulation in the se-
mantics of questions or indexicals. In the next section, we will extend this idea to
the evidential perspective shift in declaratives.
3 The perspective shift in declaratives
To account for the shift in declaratives, we first need to understand what the nature
of the reportative evidential -ray might be, since intuitively what seems to be re-
sponsible for the shift in declaratives such as (3) is the semantics of -ray rather than
the semantics of -te- (which in fact shows the shift). Specifically we investigate the
construction containing -te- and -ray in comparison with the construction contain-
ing the verb of saying (mal)ha-, which apparently introduces an implication similar
to that of -ray.
3.1 The nature of -ray
Our question here is whether the sentence containing -ray is a quotation construc-
tion or not (this amounts to asking whether -ray is actually a reportative evidential
or a phonological contraction of the verb of saying ha-). The answer seems to be
mixed. First, as pointed out by Anand & Nevins (2004), one of the characteristics
of the quotative construction is that it does not allow A’-extraction, that is, it is not
allowed to form a wh-question by extracting a wh-word from the embedded sen-
tence (or the prejacent). (15) shows that we cannot make a wh-question from the
prejacent of -te-ray, which means that A’-extraction is not possible under -te-ray.4
4 Each question in (15) has two readings depending on how the wh-word nwu(kwu) ‘who’ is inter-
preted: in one reading, nwu(kwu) is interpreted as a wh-word, but in the other reading, nwu(kwu) is
interpreted as an indefinite pronoun ‘someone’. In the first reading each question is interpreted as
a wh-question (hereafter the wh-question reading), whereas in the second reading each question is
interpreted as a yes/no question (hereafter the yes/no question reading). The yes/no question reading
is available for both questions, but this is irrelevant of our discussion. Actually, the two authors of
this paper diverge in judgments of (15): one author thinks two sentences in (15) can have either the
wh-question reading or the yes/no question reading, while the other author thinks only the yes/no
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(15) a. ??Nwu-ka
who-NOM
Mary-lul
Mary-ACC
chac-te-ray?
look.for-DIR.EVI-REP.EVI-DECL
b. ??John-i
John-NOM
nwukwu-lul
who-ACC
chac-te-ray?
look.for-DIR.EVI-REP.EVI-DECL
This suggests to us that the sentence containing -te-ray is similar to the quotative
construction rather than the construction involving evidentials. Note that -te- gen-
erally does not appear in embedded sentences, as shown in (16):
(16) John-un
John-TOP
pi-ka
rain-NOM
o-te-la-ko
fall-DIR.EVI-DECL-COMP
?malhayssta
said
/
/
??sayngkakhayssta
thought
/
/
??cwucanghayssta
claimed
/
/
??pokohayssta...
reported...
(Intended) ‘John said/thought/claimed/reported... that it rained.’ (with direct
evidential implication anchored to John)
Some authors, including Lee J. (2010), claim that examples like (16) are acceptable,
but we think that this kind of judgment is due to the confusion between embedding
and quotation. As far as we can see, -te- can appear in embedded sentences when
the main verb is the verb of saying, which means that the cases where -te- appears
in an embedded position are actually instances of quotation, not embedding. Our
claim is further supported by the fact that A’-extraction from embedded sentences
with -te- is impossible, as shown in (17):5
(17) John-un
John-TOP
Mary-ka
Mary-NOM
nwukwu-lul
who-ACC
ttayli-te-la-ko
beat-DIR.EVI-DECL-COMP
?malha-ess-ni
say-PAST-Q
/
/
??sayngkakha-ess-ni
think-PAST-Q
/
/
??cwucangha-ess-ni
claim-PAST-Q
/
/
??pokoha-ess-ni...?
report-PAST-Q...
(Intended) ‘Who did John say/think/claim/report Mary beat?’ (with direct
evidential implication anchored to John)
From these examples, one might be tempted to conclude that the example with the
ending -ray is an instance of quotation, and -ray is a phonological contraction of the
question reading is available in both questions. However, both agree that the yes/no question reading
is more easily available in both questions than the wh-question reading.
5 The judgments again vary depending on speakers. In general the verb of saying (mal)ha- ‘say’ seems
to allow -te- in the embedded position more easily, as pointed out by Chung (2010), among others,
and other verbs do not seem to allow -te- as easily as the verb of saying. We will not pursue this
issue any deeper.
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verb of saying, or at least includes a covert verb of saying (Chae 2006). However,
this conclusion seems too hasty, given that -ray allows A’-extraction as well as
exhibits perspective shifts in questions when used without -te-, as in (18):
(18) a. John-i
John-NOM
nwukwu-lul
who-ACC
chac-ass-tay?
look.for-PAST-REP.EVI?
‘Who did John look for?’ (with evidential implication anchored to the
addressee)
b. Nwukwu-ka
who-NOM
Mary-lul
Mary-ACC
chac-ass-tay?
look.for-PAST-REP.EVI?
‘Who looked for Mary?’ (with evidential implication anchored to the ad-
dressee)
Furthermore, if -ray contained a verb of saying, this verb could be the target of
negation, but as shown in (19a), -ray cannot be the target of negation, unlike the
verb of saying in (19b):
(19) a. ??John-i
John-NOM
Mary-lul
Mary-ACC
chac-te-ray-cianh-ass-e.
look.for-DIR.EVI-REP.EVI-NEG-PAST-DECL
b. (Bill-un)
(Bill-TOP)
“John-i
John-NOM
Mary-lul
Mary-ACC
chac-te-la”-ko
look.for-DIR.EVI-DECL-COMP
ha-cianh-ass-e.
say-NEG-PAST-DECL
(roughly) ‘Bill did not say “(I saw that) John looked for Mary”.’
In conclusion, at the moment it is still unclear whether -ray is a true evidential (or
expressing evidentiality in the narrow sense) or just a phonological contraction of a
verb of saying (or expressing evidentiality in the broad sense).6 If the latter is the
case, we should assume a complex sentence including the verb of saying (as argued
in Lee C. 2011, particularly in non-declarative speech acts such as interrogatives,
imperatives and propositives/exhortatives). Although here we assume that -ray is
an evidential marker different from the verb of saying, given examples like (18) and
(19) (see also Lim 2010: ch.4), below we will also argue that the lexical entry for
-ray contains semantic components comparable with those of the verb of saying.
3.2 Explaining the shift in declaratives
Tentatively, let us assume the following lexical entry for -tay/lay:
6 See Lim 2010: ch.1 for the distinction between narrow evidentiality and broad evidentiality.
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(20) For any context c∗ and any world of evaluation w∗:
J-rayKc
∗,w∗=
λk<c,st>.λcc: ∃c
′ s.t. UTTERER(c′) said to UTTERER(c) that k(c′).
λw.Jk(c′)(w)Kc,w
According to this lexical entry, -ray takes a character k as its argument, and returns
another character, with the following definedness condition: there is another context
c′ who uttered the proposition k(c′). This means that the character k, which is
the argument of -ray, first needs to apply to context c′, returning a proposition
k(c′). This proposition again becomes a character by binding the context c with an
operator. This context c also has the definedness condition, according to which the
utterer of this context c has reportative evidence from the utterer in c′.
Now let us illustrate how (20) accounts for the perspective shift in declaratives
with example (21) (repeated from (3)):
(21) John-i
John-NOM
Bill-ul
Bill-ACC
chac-te-ray.
look.for-DIR.EVI-REP.EVI
‘John looked for Bill.’
Implication: the source of the speaker’s reportative evidence has direct per-
ceptual evidence regarding the prejacent that John saw Mary.
First, the prejacent of (21) is (22), which is a proposition:
(22) λw.JJohn looked for BillKc
∗,w
-te- applies to this prejacent, returns a character:
(23) J-te-Kc
∗,w∗(λw.JJohn looked for BillKc
∗,w)
= λc: UTTERER(c) has direct perceptual evidence regarding the prejacent
that John looked for Bill. λw. JJohn looked for BillKc,w
-ray applies to the character in (23):
(24) J-rayKc
∗,w∗(λc: UTTERER(c) has direct perceptual evidence regarding the
prejacent that John looked for Bill. λw. JJohn looked for BillKc,w)=
[λk<c,st>.λcc: ∃c
′ s.t. UTTERER(c′ ) said to UTTERER(c) that k(c′).
λw.Jk(c′)(w)Kc,w](λc: UTTERER(c) has direct perceptual evidence regarding
the prejacent that John looked for Bill. λw. JJohn looked for BillKc,w)
Computing (24), we have the character (25):
(25) λc: (definedness condition in (26)).λw. JJohn looked for BillKc,w)
(25) has the following two definedness condition:
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(26) a. ∃c′ s.t. UTTERER(c′) has direct perceptual evidence regarding the preja-
cent that John looked for Bill (from the definedness condition introduced
by -te-)
b. the UTTERER(c′) said to UTTERER(c) that John looked for Bill (from the
definedness condition introduced by -ray)
These two definedness conditions explain the shift in declaratives. First, the charac-
ter k applies to the context c′ first, which is existentially bound, and the definedness
condition introduced by -te- becomes the definedness condition of c′, meaning that
the utterer in c′ should have the direct perceptual evidence regarding the prejacent
(see (26a)). However, the utterer in c′ is different from UTTERER(c), to whom the
utterer in c′ told the prejacent (see (26b)). Since the direct evidence holder (the
utterer in c′) is different from the reportative evidence holder (the utterer in c), we
have the perspective shift.
Before concluding this section, we need to address two issues. First, as shown
in (18), for example, -ray can apparently apply to a prejacent without -te-. Does this
mean that -ray can also apply to a proposition? If not, how do we resolve this poten-
tial type-mismatch? To answer this question, we adopt Lim’s (2010) proposal, and
assume that there is a phonologically null type-shifter, or a phonologically covert
evidential which is used ‘by default’, possibly introducing the implication that the
speaker’s assertion is based on his/her best possible grounds. The lexical entry for
this default evidential will look like (27) (compare this with the lexical entry for -te-
in (9)):
(27) JNULL-EVIKc
∗ ,w∗(JφKc
∗,w∗) = λc: UTTERER(c) asserts φ based on his/her
best possible grounds. λw. JφKc,w
Second, we argued that the result of applying a Korean evidential - either -te- or
-ray to a prejacent is a character. However, this character still needs to become a
proposition in a given utterance context c∗. We assume that this can be done by a
declarative ending,7 which is plausible given that Korean declarative endings vary
depending on the utterance context (specifically, depending on the social status of
the utterer and the addressee as well as the register, which is analyzed in terms of
the definedness condition in Lim 2010). According to this assumption, the lexical
entry for the declarative ending in Korean is as follows (we omit the definedness
condition for the social statuses of conversational participants and the register):
(28) JDECLKc
∗ ,w∗ = λk<c,st>. k(c
∗)
In cases of -ray, which can appear in the position of the declarative ending, we fur-
ther assume that the declarative ending is -a/e, which is phonologically contracted.
7 We also assume that the question ending plays a similar role: see Lim 2010: ch.5.
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4 Context overwriting and the Korean long-distance anaphor caki
In this section we argue that the idea that Korean evidentials show context over-
writing effect can account for the puzzle regarding the interaction between Korean
long-distance anaphor caki and Korean direct perceptual evidential -te-, first noticed
by Lim (to appear).
4.1 Puzzle
It is known that Korean anaphor caki can be used as a long-distance anaphor re-
ferring to the attitude holder in the main predicate when the attitude holder has the
relevant self-knowledge (hereafter de se knowledge). For example, (29) is felici-
tous only when Pavarotti knows that the singer who he thinks is a genius is actually
Pavarotti himself: it is infelicitous when Pavarotti does not know that the singer is
Pavarotti himself.
(29) Pavarottii-nun
Pavarotti-TOP
cakii-ka
self-NOM
chenjay-la-ko
genius-DECL-COMP
sayngkakha-ess-ta.
think-PAST-DECL
‘Pavarotti thought that he is a genius.’
However, Lim (to appear) observes that there are several cases where caki can be
used as a long-distance anaphor even when the attitude holder does not have de se
knowledge. Consider the scenario (30) from Lim to appear.
(30) Bill and John are close friends. Their children are also close friends, and
go to the same school. Once Bill and John were invited to the school. In
the school, when both Bill and John were observing a class from a distance,
they saw a child causing trouble during class. After class, Bill asks Tom,
the teacher, to scold that child, not knowing that he was his own son. John,
however, noticed this. He says later...
In this scenario, the attitude holder is Bill, who does not have the relevant de se
knowledge (he does not know that the troubling kid is actually his son). In contrast,
the utterer is John, who has knowledge about the relation between Bill and the
troublesome kid. This said, consider two examples in (31) (again from Lim to
appear):
(31) a. #Billi-i
Bill-NOM
Tom-eykey
Tom-DAT
cakii
self
atul-ul
son-ACC
honnay-la-ko
scold-IMP-COMP
malha-ess-ta.
say-PAST-DECL
b. Billi-i
Bill-NOM
Tom-eykey
Tom-DAT
cakii
self
atul-ul
son-ACC
honnay-la-ko
scold-IMP-COMP
malha-te-la.
say-DIR.EVI-DECL
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‘Billi told Tom to scold selfi’s son.’
Implication: the utterer (John) saw Bill told Tom to scold his own son.
As indicated, (31a) is infelicitous under the scenario (30), which is expected: the
attitude holder Bill does not know that the troublesome kid is his son, and therefore
does not have the relevant de se knowledge. However, (31b) with the direct per-
ceptual evidential -te- can be used felicitously even in the given scenario. This fact
requires a semantic account.
Not only caki, but also PRO (which is only used as de se/de te anaphor: see
Chierchia 1989, among others) can be exceptionally licensed under -te- (Hoe in
preparation). Consider the following scenario (revised from Anand 2006: 16):
(32) Bill is hosting a party. He hears that a certain waiter named Tom is being a
nuisance. Now Bill tells the nearest waiter, “Tom has to go." However, John,
a guest of the party, noticed that the waiter Bill is talking to is actually Tom.
John later said to someone else...
Similarly to (30), the attitude holder Bill does not have the relevant de te knowledge,
but the utterer John knows that the addressee Bill was talking to is actually Tom
himself. In this case, (33a) shows that PRO is not licensed, as expected, but (33b)
also shows PRO can be licensed when -te- is used.
(33) a. #Billi-i
Bill-NOM
Tom j-eykey
Tom-DAT
PRO j
PRO
ttena-la-ko
leave-IMP-COMP
malha-ess-ta.
say-PAST-DECL
b. Billi-i
Bill-NOM
Tom j-eykey
Tom-DAT
PRO j
PRO
ttena-la-ko
leave-IMP-COMP
malha-te-la.
say-te-DECL
‘Bill told Tom to leave.’
Implication: the utterer (John) saw that Bill told Tom to leave.
These examples suggest to us that the presence of -te- is responsible for the excep-
tional licensing of de se/de te anaphors such as caki and PRO. In the next subsec-
tion, we will briefly outline our (tentative) analysis of this puzzle, with a complete
analysis with computation in Lim & Lee C. in preparation.
4.2 Tentative solution
To account for the exceptional licensing of caki under -te-, following Schlenker
2003 and Anand & Nevins 2004, we assume that attitude predicates, such as malha-
‘say’, introduce their own context against which the embedded proposition is eval-
uated. For example, schematically, the LF with the attitude holder Bill and the
attitude predicate malha- can be represented as in (34), where the utterance context
is c∗ and the context introduced by malha- is c′:
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(34) [ c∗ [ Bill ... [ malha- [ c′ . . . ] ] ] ]
We further assume that, when -te- is used, it overwrites not only the context c∗for
the prejacent, but also the context c′ for the propositional complement of the attitude
predicate in a ‘global’ manner (we do not specify the definedness condition for the
context c introduced by -te-):
(35) [ -te- [ c∗ [ Bill ... [ malha- [ c′ . . . ] ] ] ] ]
= [ λc [ c [ Bill ... [ malha- [ c . . . ] ] ] ] ]
Finally, Korean caki and PRO are bound by an operator introduced by the atti-
tude predicate, as commonly assumed in previous studies of de se/de te pronouns
(Chierchia 1989 and Anand 2006, among others). However, rather than abstracting
the utterer parameter in the context, we posit the following definedness condition
for caki/PRO to be bound by an operator (in the same way as the presupposition of
bound pronouns proposed in Heim 2008):
(36) caki/PRO can be used as de se/de te anaphor only when the utterer of the
context has knowledge about the identity of the antecedent of caki/PRO (or
relevant de se/de te knowledge).8
Given these assumptions, we can account for the exceptional licensing of caki/PRO
under -te- as follows. Normally, the utterer of the embedded context c′ becomes
the attitude holder. In a scenario such as (30) and (32), the attitude holder Bill does
not have relevant knowledge about the reference of caki/PRO. Therefore, in sen-
tences like (31a) and (33a), the definedness condition for caki/PRO is not satisfied
under the embedded context c′, since the utterer of c′ is Bill, who does not have the
relevant de se/de te knowledge. This explains why (31a) and (33a) are infelicitous
under the given scenario. In cases where -te- is used, the utterer of the embedded
context is not the attitude holder, but the evidence holder in the bound context vari-
able c, which is eventually saturated to the utterer’s context c∗. In our scenarios,
since this utterer has the relevant knowledge about the reference of caki/PRO, the
definedness condition is satisfied by the evidence holder, and therefore caki/PRO
can be licensed.
Before concluding this section, we also need to address one issue. The main
motivation for the context overwriting in Anand &Nevins 2004 was to argue against
Schlenker’s (2003) account for the shift of indexicals, which is based on the lexical
ambiguity of indexicals (that is, whether an indexical is anchored to the context
introduced by an attitude predicate or to the utterance context) and to explain the
8 This approach implies that caki and PRO are treated as usual pronouns with a definedness condition,
not pronouns specialized to the utterer or to the addressee of the context. At the moment we do not
know what the conclusion or the possible prediction of this approach might be.
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indexical shifting in certain languages based on the context overwriting operator.
In this paper we assume the various types of context overwriting, which naturally
leads us to asking: what happens to the indexicals in Korean? It is beyond the scope
of this paper to answer this question in detail, but we simply assume that Korean
indexicals are always dependent on the utterance context c∗ (or we may assume that
Korean indexicals have to be anchored to the context introduced by the sentential
ending, such as the declarative ending in (28), which is always anchored to the
utterance context c∗). This assumption is plausible given that in Korean indexicals
never shift (see Lim 2010: cf. Byun 2008), but this may also mean that we need
both the context overwriting (a la Anand & Nevins 2004, among others) and (cross-
linguistic) lexical ambiguities for indexicals (a la Schlenker 2003, among others).
At the moment we do not know what the further empirical/theoretical implications
of this assumption might be, and we leave this issue for future research.9
5 Conclusion
In this paper we discussed two types of evidential perspective shift in Korean, and
argued that they can receive a unified analysis if we assume that Korean evidentials
are functions taking either a proposition (in cases of -te-) or a character (in cases
of -ray) as their arguments and returning a character. We also argued that Korean
evidentials overwrite contexts of their prejacent, and discussed how this context-
overwriting effect interacts with the interpretation of Korean long-distance anaphor
caki/PRO.
We conclude our paper by discussing one theoretical implication our paper has.
We analyze Korean evidentials as functions taking a proposition (in cases of -te-) or
a character (in cases of -ray) as their argument and returning a character. This means
they are not spatiotemporal deictic tenses in the sense of Faller 2004 (contra what
Chung (2007) claims regarding -te-), illocutionary operators in the sense of Faller
2002 (see the discussion in Lim 2010), or epistemic modals (contra what Lee J.
(2010) claims regarding -te-). We believe that many previous studies of evidentials
in the area of formal semantics simply try to ‘assimilate’ the grammatical category
of an evidential under investigation to one of the three preexisting categories (epis-
temic modals, illocutionary operators, or deictic tenses: see Matthewson, Davis &
Rullmann 2007), and in cases of Korean evidentials there is no exception. How-
ever, our study shows that we should not be satisfied with that. We need to consider
empirical differences between languages more seriously, and if we do so, it seems
9 One possible alternative is that what is overwritten by an evidential marker in Korean is not the
context itself, but just a judge or assessor parameter, as argued in McCready 2007. However, we are
not convinced that the requirement of the judge parameter is empirically enough supported: see von
Fintel & Gillies 2008, among others.
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reasonable to conclude that there can be more than these three preexisting lexical
categories for evidentials: different languages may have different types of gram-
matical categories for evidentials.
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